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Robert Solow, the Nobel laureate, once opined that "an economic historian is merely an economist with a high tolerance for dust". 1 In making this statement, Solow was railing against the cliometric revolution, and was arguing that economic history needed to be much more than merely testing economic theories using thin data. In a similar vein, I will make a plea in this essay that the financial historian should not merely be a financial economist with a high tolerance for dust and data entry.
The main purpose of this essay is to analyse the bidirectional relationship between financial history and financial economics because, as we will see below, they both have something to contribute to each other. In order to analyse this bidirectional relationship, we will critically examine how financial economics has affected and been used in financial history. Some suggestions as to potential future uses of financial economics in financial history will also be made. We will then explore the contributions that financial history has made and can make in the future to financial economics. The main argument that is developed in this essay is that financial history has more to offer financial economics than vice versa.
Financial economics, as a discipline, is closely related to, but sits somewhat separately from, the academic study of banking and financial intermediation. Banking theory has largely been developed by economists interested in industrial organization and the macroeconomy.
2 This essay will adhere to this strict subject delineation and will therefore not be analysing the relationship between banking theory and banking history.
The first section of this essay is a condensed history of financial economics, where the three foundational pillars of the discipline are identified and discussed, namely asset pricing, corporate finance, and the efficient markets hypothesis. The subsequent most important 1 Solow, "Economic History", p. 331.
2 See, for example, Freixas and Rochet, Microeconomics of Banking. developments in the discipline are also discussed i.e., agency or corporate governance, option pricing, and behavioural finance.
The second main section of this essay looks at the effect of financial economics on the practice of financial history. In particular, it critically examines how the three foundational pillars of financial economics as well as the three subsequent developments in the field have affected financial history. The section also highlights some of the dangers of applying financial economics to financial history as well as looking at some future directions the application of financial economics to financial history could take.
The third part of this essay is an analysis of how financial history has contributed and can contribute to the development of financial economics. Some areas within financial economics, such as empirical asset pricing, are intrinsically backwards looking as they require long series of returns. However, financial history can provide financial economists with more than out-of-sample tests and natural experiments of asset pricing models.
Financial history also provides financial economics with a wide variety of asset price reversals, which allow various economic theories of 'bubble' formation to be tested. In addition, we will see that financial history enables tests of corporate finance theories which ex ante rule out several important explanatory factors. Finally, in this section, we shall see that financial history provides insights into fundamental features of modern capital markets and corporations, such as securities regulation and limited liability, both of which are regarded as necessary prerequisites for the functioning of financial markets, because some of these alleged foundational features were not always present in the past.
A condensed history of financial economics
As a discipline, financial history predates financial economics. The genesis of financial economics as a separate field or subject in its own right can be traced back to the 1950s.
Although financial economics covers a broad range of topics, the central and foundational pillars of the discipline, which were erected in its first two decades as a discipline, are corporate finance, asset pricing, and the efficient markets hypothesis. Lintner, "Distribution". 4 Modigliani and Miller, "The Cost of Capital", "Dividend Policy". 5 Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics. 6 Miller, "The History of Finance". 7 Hart, "Financial Contracting".
The attempts to fix up the Modigliani-Miller model over the past five decades have involved the weakening of some of their key assumptions. The earliest attempt to fix up the Modigliani-Miller model involved the introduction of tax (both corporate and personal), but created something of a puzzle in that the optimal dividend policy is that firms should pay zero dividends and the optimal capital structure is 100 per cent debt finance.
8 Subsequent attempts to fix up the model focussed on agency costs and asymmetric information. The agency cost models suggested that agency costs ultimately determine a firm's capital structure and dividend policy. 9 Meanwhile asymmetric information models suggest that managers pay dividends or raise debt finance in order to send costly-to-replicate signals to investors.
10
Seminal work was also taking place in the 1950s in the area of asset pricing. Harry
Markowitz, an operations research graduate at the University of Chicago, published a paper in 1952 which ultimately revolutionised the theory and practice of financial economics.
11
Markowitz's key insight was that he identified the return on an investment with its probability-weighted mean value of its possible outcomes and its risk with the variance of those outcomes around the mean. This was revolutionary at the time, and by identifying risk and return with variance and mean, Markowitz was able to apply statistical methods to form efficient portfolios i.e., a portfolio where an investor cannot lower their risk without sacrificing returns and vice versa. The explanation provided was that, in an efficient market, arbitrage ensures that all available information pertinent to the valuation of a security is reflected in its price. Thus stock price changes were random because the arrival of new information about a security's value was random. This theory was refined somewhat by Fama in his 1970 paper to take account of the fact that there were some elements of predictability in long-run returns. 16 He differentiated between the weak, semi-strong and strong forms of the efficient markets hypothesis, which alluded to the type of information reflected in security prices. 12 Sharpe, "Capital Asset Prices"; Independently and simultaneously, Lintner, "The Valuation of Risk Assets" and Mossin, "Equilibrium" developed similar capital asset pricing models. 13 Fama and French, "Common Risk Factors", "The Cross-Section".
14 Kendall, "The Analysis"; Working, "New Concepts"; Roberts, "Stock-Market Patterns". 15 Cowles, "A Revision"; Cootner, "Stock Prices"; Samuelson, "Proof"; Fama, "Behavior". 16 Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets". 
The use of financial economics in financial history
In this section of the essay we want to (a) establish the extent to which financial economics is used in financial history, (b) examine critically how the three foundational pillars of financial economics outlined above as well as the three important topics which have subsequently emerged have been used in financial history, and (c) outline the possible ways financial economics can be used in the future development of financial history. an increased number of financial history articles in these journals, and thus may reflect an increasing influence of financial economics on financial history. Fourth, given the relative youth of financial economics at the time as well as some of the finance journals, it is unsurprising that finance journals are rarely cited in the 1970s. Indeed, none of the finance journals in Table 2 are cited in the two economic history journals prior to 1970.
The above raises the following question: why has the use of financial economics in financial history increased since 1970, and particularly in the 2000s? The cliometrics revolution in economic history plays something of a role in encouraging the early growth.
However, the huge increase in the 2000s has two sources. First, unlike previous generations, the new generation of economic historians has been trained in financial economics. Second, and probably most importantly, technological advances have enabled scholars working in financial history to utilise the toolbox of financial economics. Financial economics at its core is an empirical discipline which requires lots of data and computational power to process data. The digitisation of newspapers and periodicals has dramatically reduced the costs of acquiring market price data from earlier periods. For example, the International Center for
Finance at Yale University has digitised many early price lists such as the Investor's Monthly
Manual for 1869-1929. In addition, digital photography and optical character recognition software has enabled scholars to gather the large amounts of data required for rigorous analysis.
In terms of corporate finance, one of the earliest attempts in financial history to use corporate finance theory was by Baskin and Miranti. 21 In their book, they draw heavily on the asymmetric information and (to a lesser extent) agency theories developed in corporate finance to interpret and understand the evolution of corporate finance from the preindustrial world through to the modern era. Their broad coverage of time and space helps us understand the role asymmetric information plays in the development of corporate financial policies over time. One of their main insights is that dividends can be used to signal information to investors and a pecking-order model of capital structure explains why firms issued so much debt in the pre-tax era. 22 Subsequent to Baskin and Miranti, there has been little in the way of empirical work into capital structure and dividend policies of firms in the past apart from a two studies of dividend policy which look at the UK in the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century. historians have tested the efficiency of the market for UK debt in the nineteenth century as well as the efficiency of the German stock exchange at the turn of the twentieth century.
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As tests of the efficient markets hypothesis face the joint hypothesis problem, tests of market efficiency conducted by financial historians have also been tests of the underlying asset pricing model. The discovery of the size and value anomalies were at first believed to undermine the efficient markets hypothesis, but latterly, the prevailing view is that these anomalies are simply manifestations of deficiencies with the capital asset pricing model.
Thanks to the development of large stock-market databases, financial historians have tested for the presence of these anomalies in several early capital markets.
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The ability of financial historians to use asset pricing models crucially depends on high quality stock-market indices, which include dividend income as well as capital gains / 37 Miller, "The History of Finance". 38 Moore and Juh, "Derivative Pricing". 39 Shea, "Understanding Financial Derivatives".
The one area of financial economics which has had a limited effect on financial history is the topic of behavioural finance. This could be to do with data limitations and lack of information on investor behaviour in the past. The lack of engagement of financial history with behavioural finance is somewhat strange given that investors in early capital markets were usually retail investors not institutions and that, in the era before a scientific approach to investing and financial theory had been developed, investors may have devised heuristics influenced by their behavioural biases such as underweighting probable in comparison with certain outcomes, self-control, regret aversion or mental accounting. Notably, a study of dividend policy in the UK in the nineteenth century found no evidence of that investors preferred dividends to capital because of behavioural biases or that managers catered to such biases.
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As highlighted above, the use of financial economics in financial history has undoubtedly provided insights into how financial institutions and markets evolved in the past.
However, there lurk three major dangers that we need to be cognisant of when applying modern financial theories to financial history.
The first danger is that financial history becomes merely a laboratory for financial economics. In the parlance of the discipline, historical episodes merely become out-ofsample tests of contemporary theories. This approach to financial history raises the danger that we remove the poetry out of financial history. 41 Financial history is full of fascinating characters, institutions, and incidents and these are what give it a soul as a discipline. As the use of financial economics (rightly) increases, we need to ensure that we do not lose the story-telling genius of scholars like Kindleberger, Michie and Taylor. 42 Another danger is that the emphasis on financial economics means that financial historians ignore or place less emphasis on the cultural, economic, legal, social, and political environment in which financial institutions and markets have operated in in the past. In particular, the political environment has had a significant effect on the development of financial institutions and markets in the past. After all, some of the earliest liquid financial markets were for government bonds and the early central banks were created to help finance government war efforts. Thankfully, it appears that the next generation of financial historians is giving attention to the environment in which financial institutions and markets in the past emerged.
The final and probably the most commonly-accepted danger is that applying modern finance theories to historical episodes can be anachronistic. This danger particularly applies to theories of asset pricing. 43 A key assumption of modern asset pricing models is that the investment decision is simply determined by portfolio payoffs. 44 However, in nascent capital markets, portfolio diversification may have been very costly due to a combination of factors such as high share denominations, unlimited shareholder liability, high transactions costs, restrictions on free incorporation, and poor investor protection laws.
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Another assumption of modern asset pricing theories is that investment assets are not also consumption assets. This assumption may not have held for bank shares in the nineteenth century as there was a well-documented access-to-credit benefit of owning bank 42 shares. 46 In addition, individuals may have bought shares in companies providing a public good out of civic pride or sense of responsibility or to prevent providers of such goods from abusing their monopoly power.
A further assumption of modern asset pricing theories is that investors have full information on the distribution of asset payoffs. However, in nascent capital markets with primitive accounting practices, poor disclosure requirements, and no analyst coverage, it is likely that investors had less-than-full information on the distribution of asset payoffs, and this may have manifested itself in stockholders exhibiting a local bias to share investment.
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This may explain why local stock exchanges played a prominent role in the development of early capital markets.
Finally, much of modern finance theory assumes that capital markets are liquid, but this was far from the case in nascent capital markets, where the majority of stocks were very thinly traded. Infrequently traded stocks create all sorts of problems when using modern asset pricing theories. First, stocks in historical markets may have been so thinly traded that it is impossible to get a sensible beta estimate for a stock. Second, financial economics assumes that asset returns have a bell-shape, with the consequence that the standard deviation is a good measure of the riskiness of an asset. However, if a stock trades infrequently, there will not be much of a distribution of prices, with the result that the standard deviation is very low. This does not, however, mean that the risk or volatility of an asset is low. Third, illiquidity in early markets may have worked against portfolio diversification, which makes the application of modern portfolio theory in such historical situations anachronistic. 46 Acheson and Turner, "Investor Behaviour."
47 Notably, even analysis of modern financial markets suggests that individuals tend to invest in companies which are in close proximity (Coval and Moskowitz, "Home Bias") .
Having warned of the dangers of using financial economics in financial history, what is the possible future direction for the application of financial economics within financial history apart from those alluded to above? One area where the application of financial economics to financial history may prove increasingly fruitful is to use historical asset prices to ascertain the economic effect of large events such as political changes, macroeconomic shocks, or technological change. As asset prices reflect (imperfectly) how investors perceive institutional changes or value technology, asset pricing models can be applied (with caveats mentioned above) to historical asset prices to provide insights for economists and economic historians alike. For example, historical asset prices have be used to analyse the economic effects of innovation before and after the Great Depression. 48 Historical asset prices can also reveal something about the importance and real economic effects of political events such as franchise changes or wars.
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The use of financial history in financial economics
In some senses, financial economics is an inherently backwards-looking discipline. For example, tests of the efficient markets hypothesis, empirical asset pricing, and option pricing models all rely on historical financial data, and the further back the data series stretches, the more accurate the pricing models. However, this in-built historical bent to financial economics is not reflected in citations of financial history articles in the leading financial economics journals. As can be seen from Table 3 , the number of articles from the Journal of Economic History and Economic History Review cited in the Journal of Finance and Review of Financial Studies is very low, and before 2000, citations were almost non-existent. 48 Nicholas, "Does Innovation". 49 Turner and Zhan, "Property Rights"; Frey and Kucher, "History as Reflected in Capital Markets".
The rest of this section will highlight how financial history has been and can be used to help the development of financial economics as a discipline. In particular, we will focus on what financial history has contributed and can contribute to asset pricing, corporate finance, agency, and options. We will also highlight important origin-type questions for financial economics which cannot be answered with modern data.
The most obvious way in which financial history has contributed to financial economics is the development of long-run stock-market return series. These series can be used to determine the returns on traditional investment assets such as bonds and shares over the long-run as well as returns on alternative investments such as stamps and art. 50 Such long-run series can also be used to measure the equity premium in an attempt to figure out why the equity risk premium is so high. 51 The estimation of the equity risk premium using only twentieth-century financial data induces a time-selection bias as stock markets have been in existence for much longer. This bias can be partially avoided by investigating historical stock markets. For example, studies on the US market find that taking the nineteenth century into consideration reduces the estimate of the long-term equity premium for the US market. 52 In addition, the influential suggestion that rare event risk can explain the equity premium puzzle implicitly requires financial history to assess how the extent to which rare events affects the equity premium.
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Testing for stock market anomalies such as the size and value effect in modern markets is problematic because different stock markets are highly correlated and anomalies 50 For long-run returns on alternative investments see Dimson and Spaenjers, "Ex Post"; Goetzmann et al. "Art and Money". 51 Mehra and Prescott, "The Equity Premium". 52 Siegel, "The Equity Premium"; Goetzmann and Ibbotson, "History and the Equity Premium". 53 Barro, "Rare Disasters"; Berkman et al., "Time-Varying Rare Disaster Risk". may be arbitraged away following their discovery. 54 Consequently, studies of returns from historical stock markets provide robust out-of-sample tests for anomalies and help us discern whether anomalies are durable features of stock markets, suggesting that there may be economic or behavioural reasons, rather than data-snooping reasons, for their existence.
Tests for the presence of anomalies in historical markets may be superior in that they had few distortions, in the form of tax and regulation, relative to modern markets For example, studies on the size and value effects in the pre-1913 UK market find that there was no size effect in this market, but that there was a value effect.
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Financial history has the potential to provide natural experiments which enable financial economists to test asset pricing theories. For example, Koudijs uses the arrival dates of London mail boats in Amsterdam, which were carrying information on English securities, to identify the flow of information and measure the effect of this information flow on volatility of English securities which were traded on the Amsterdam market. 56 Similarly, financial economists have looked at IPO underpricing in an era before comprehensive regulation and disclosure requirements and found that it was substantially lower than in the modern era.
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Probably the most important way financial history can contribute to asset pricing is in the area of asset price reversals or 'bubbles'. As asset price reversals are not commonly occurring events, financial economists and others have increasingly been looking at financial history to gain insights into the underlying causes of asset price reversals. Studies on historical bubbles in financial markets have typically attempted to argue that bubbles can be 54 Schwert, "Anomalies and Market Efficiency". 55 Grossman and Shore, "The Cross Section"; Ye and Turner, "Hardy Perennial". 56 Koudijs, "The Boats".
57 Chambers and Dimson, "IPO Underpicing". explained by rational factors, such as the emergence of new technology and myopia, or irrational behaviour or naiveté on the part of investors. 58 One study, which looks at the stockmarket boom in 1920s Germany, has emphasised the dangers of government or central bank intervention to prick stock markets booms. 59 Evidence from the South Sea bubble has revealed that rational investors ride bubbles even though they know that prices are not being driven by fundamentals. 60 In addition, a study on the British railway mania has examined the role of news media in bubbles, and has absolved the press from hyping railway shares.
61
Financial history can provide several insights for theories about dividend policy and capital structure. As income, capital gains, and corporation tax were effectively non-existent or very low in most economies prior to the twentieth century, tax can be ruled out ex ante as a determinant of capital structure or dividend policy in such eras. In addition, regulation regarding stock repurchases has varied over the very long run, making for a novel experiment as to how dividend policy changes with the introduction of regulation. In essence, the environment corporations operated in a century ago was free of the distortions that have been introduced by regulation and taxation. Institutional investors are also another feature of financial markets in the late twentieth century which were not present or active a century ago.
Hence, studies of dividend policy in the nineteenth century can ex ante rule out institutional preferences for dividends as an explanatory variable for dividend behaviour. history has contributed to our understanding of when and how ownership separated from control. 64 It has also contributed something to our understanding of how agency problems were ameliorated in an era before investor protection laws, corporate governance codes, and executive stock options. 65 However, financial economics needs more studies on agency in the past across different jurisdictions to see how our ancestors ameliorated the agency problems inherent in the corporate form.
Growing out of the agency literature, the topic of law and finance, which looks at how statutory, judge-made and securities law affects financial markets and corporate finance, emerged as a very influential area of study in the 1990s. 66 This literature argues that common-law (as opposed to civil-law) legal origin results in superior investor protection, which in turn has a positive effect on financial development. However, much of the active debate about this theory has been ahistorical, which is somewhat puzzling given the obvious historical nature of the legal-origins hypothesis, and that financial history presents the greatest challenge to this hypothesis.
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First, the evidence on the variation of investor protection law and financial developments over the very long run suggests that there is not much relationship between financial development and investor protection. 68 Second, there was little difference in financial development and investor protection laws between common and civil law economies in circa 1913. 69 Financial history can contribute so much more to this area of financial economics by addressing issues such as the dynamics of changes in investor protection law across time and space, how commercial laws were transplanted into colonies, why investor protection laws change over time, and how investors protected themselves in the past whenever investor protection laws were primitive.
Studies of option pricing in the past have given insights into the complex heuristics used by options traders before and after the Black-Scholes-Merton formula. 70 The accuracy of options pricing in historical settings implies that the canonical view that the creation of the Black-Scholes-Merton formula caused the subsequent growth in option markets should be questioned. 71 Historical settings also allow financial economists to see how different market structures and rules affect the options market.
Probably the greatest contribution financial history can make to financial economics is that it can provide insights into features of modern capital markets and corporations that are regarded as foundational and necessary prerequisites for the functioning of financial markets. The reason that financial history can do this is that some of these foundational features were not always present in the past. For example, the existence of corporate law, 67 Musacchio and Turner, "Does the Law and Finance Hypothesis". 68 Musacchio, "Can Civil Law"; Coyle and Turner, "Law, Politics and Financial Development". 69 Rajan and Zingales, "The Great Reversals"; Musacchio, "Law and Finance"; Musacchio and Turner, "Does the Law and Finance Hypothesis". 70 Haug and Taleb, "Option Traders". 71 Moore and Juh, "Derivative Pricing". disclosure requirements, and securities regulation are regarded as prerequisites for the functioning of modern capital markets, but securities markets in the past had cursory regulation and little in the way of corporate law or disclosure requirements. How efficient were these markets in the past at channelling funds to companies and in processing information?
Another example is limited liability. The canonical view is that limited liability is essential to industrial capitalism and is a prerequisite for stock markets. The standard argument is that once liability is no longer limited, shares can no longer be freely traded on stock markets; otherwise an equilibrium will be reached where the extended liability becomes 
Summary
This essay has demonstrated the various ways in which financial economics has been used in financial history. Undoubtedly, the increased use of financial economics in financial history 72 Woodward, "Limited Liability". 73 Acheson et al., "Does Limited Liability Matter". 74 Acheson et al., "The Character". 75 Grossman, "Double Liability"; Grossman and Imai, "Contingent Capital". has helped to invigorate the study of financial history. Nevertheless, as highlighted in this essay, we need to be careful that the idiosyncrasies of historical financial markets and institutions are considered whenever we apply modern financial theories in financial history.
Thus, similar to Solow's clarion call to economic historians, financial historians need to make sure that the discipline is enriched and not corrupted by financial economics.
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In the long run, however, financial history may prove to be of more use to financial economics than vice versa. Amongst other things, financial history provides financial economists with natural experiments, a long-run perspective on the discipline, and environments 'unpolluted' by taxation and regulation. More fundamentally, however, financial history reveals something of the wisdom of our ancestors and how they addressed the complex agency and information problems inherent in financial markets and institutions.
Consequently, the challenge for current and future generations of financial historians is to engage in work which not only is of interest to their financial history peers, but which contributes to the development of financial economics. 76 Solow, "Economic History". 
